Remarks

Martin Heidegger’s main thesis in his monumental work Being and Time is that the question of the meaning of being has been historically forgotten (Seinsvergessenheit) and needs to be recovered.

But what if the concept of being is primitive? A primitive term is a concept which is both understood by all (who know the language) but also undefinable. We see many examples of this in mathematics, including such notions as a point, line, set, class, and other terms. Although we understand what such objects are, we cannot define them in terms of any prior notion.

Hence, in many modern geometries, such terms are simply left without definition, and presumed as the basis for the definition of other terms.

In a recent paper, I argue that the concept of “being” may be primitive in this sense.

Being is the most universal concept. Being comprehends “all things”. There is in consequence no prior notion that could be used to define what being means. But if this is the case, then Heidegger’s question of the meaning of being becomes a pseudo-question.

Of course, the whole account of the meaning of being does not end there. Classically, the concept of being is understood to be analogical.

But that is a story for another time.