My research developed by way of a gradual return to the fundamental questions of philosophy. I completed my doctoral studies in philosophy in 2009 at KU Leuven (Belgium), where I examined Arthur Schopenhauer’s interpretation of Plato’s Ideas. My early publications grew naturally out of this work. Yet the more I examined Schopenhauer, the more I found myself drawn back to Kant and into the central metaphysical questions that have occupied philosophers since antiquity.
What began as a specialized study gradually became a broader investigation into the nature of philosophy itself, the meaning of being, and the perennial problem of the one and the many. This journey has taken me across the history of philosophy—from Plato and Aristotle to the medieval scholastics and modern thinkers—in search of the first principles that underlie philosophical inquiry.
My current research focuses on the possibility of developing a rigorous theory of the one and the many beyond its original foundations in ancient Greek philosophy. The articles and books now in preparation represent the fruit of many years of study and reflection on this problem and mark the beginning of this next stage of my scholarly work.
Journal Articles
You can access select papers at ResearchGate.
(2026) Miracles and Mathematical Constraints. Studia Philosophiae Christianiae. (FORTHCOMING)
Abstract: How can miracles occur without violating the laws of nature? Setting aside the epistemological question of how miracles are recognized, this paper addresses the metaphysical problem of how divine action relates to the natural order. It begins with the traditional conception of miracles as events contrary to nature and Hume’s influential account of miracles as violations of natural law. After considering objections to Hume, including appeals to divine agency, suspension, and causal intervention, the paper argues that these approaches leave the conceptual problem unresolved. To reframe the debate, it introduces the notions of systems and constraints. A natural system is understood as a set of possible states of affairs governed by operative constraints. Within this framework, a miracle is an act of God that temporarily extends the constraints governing the natural system, thereby permitting otherwise impossible states without violating or suspending the laws of nature. This preserves both the integrity of nature and the efficacy of divine action.
(2021). Aristotle and the Classical Paradigm of Wisdom. Philosophy International Journal, 4(3). doi: 10.23880/phij-16000191.
Abstract: The purpose of this essay is to provide an interpretation of the ancient Greek origin of philosophy relative to the development of the concept of wisdom. The nature of the sage is first considered. The sage is one who is deemed wise in his or her performances. But what is ‘wise’ about such performances? The Socratic denial of sage status is considered in reference to this. Socrates concludes that he is not wise as the gods are wise, but that he is wise insofar as he knows that he is not wise. The apparent contradiction is resolved through the distinction between human (finite) and divine (infinite) wisdom. The latter notion is further examined in the works of Aristotle who articulates the “classical paradigm” of philosophy in pursuit of infinite wisdom. The attributes of infinite wisdom are identified, and the essay concludes with a discussion of the sagely performance of infinite wisdom, Aristotle himself serving as the representative example.
(2021). On the Therapeutic Value of Contemplation. International Journal of Philosophical Practice, 7(1): 79-88.
Abstract: In recent times, we have seen a resurgence of interest in the application of philosophy as a therapeutic for the purpose of alleviating the existential ills of human life. Within this paper, it is argued that not only can philosophy be applied as a therapeutic, but that the very act of doing philosophy is therapeutic. The paper begins with a discussion of human nature as bound to finitude and the suffering of existence. The necessity to labor along with the need for relief from labor in the form of recreation and play is then discussed. Play is thereafter distinguished from leisure, and the concept of philosophical contemplation (theoria), following Aristotle, is introduced. It is argued that the activity of contemplation results in relief from the suffering of existence, and that its exercise may in consequence be considered a kind of therapeutic.
(2020). Schopenhauer on Intuition and Proof in Mathematics. In Language, Logic, and Mathematics in Schopenhauer: Studies in Universal Logic, J. Lemanski (ed.), Springer-Birkhauser, June 2020, 287-303.
Abstract: Although Arthur Schopenhauer adopts the substance of Kantian idealism within his work, his own theory of cognition nonetheless involves a departure from Kant’s original views. He both rejects Kant’s deduction of the pure concepts of understanding and likewise formulates what amounts to a “radical” divide between intuitive and abstract knowledge. Within this essay, the larger consequences of these changes are explored as they apply to his account of the nature and distinction between intuition and proof within mathematics, and in particular, within geometry. As will be shown, Schopenhauer tends to be largely dismissive of proof procedures within geometry that rely heavily upon the use of formal reasoning and logic on the grounds that such procedures serve only to rationally confirm what is already known on an intuitive basis insofar as mathematics, following Kant, is understood to be ultimately rooted in a priori cognition. In contrast, Schopenhauer proposes an intuitive model for proof on the basis of his own account of the principle of sufficient reason, where the “ground of being” of a theorem is directly exposed, thereby rendering any additional proof procedure redundant. Although offering an interesting perspective in regards to the nature of intuitive evidence within mathematics, Schopenhauer’s proposal nonetheless leads to a number of difficulties in regards to our knowledge of mathematics that in the end renders such a proposal problematic. These problems are explored and the essay concludes with an examination of the historical context out of which Schopenhauer’s views on this issue might be read and interpreted.
(2020). Schopenhauer’s Interpretation of the Platonic Ideas. The International Journal of the Platonic Tradition, 1-23. doi: https://doi.org/10.1163/18725473-BJA10001
Abstract: A contentious feature in the thought of Arthur Schopenhauer is his account of the Platonic Ideas. This is no doubt evidenced by the scholarly literature where various difficulties have been identified in regards to this introduction, and often varying positions maintained. Within this essay, I offer a survey of the major debates surrounding this issue. Following this, I turn to a specific question related to Schopenhauer’s claim that his own account of the Platonic Ideas is authentic to the original views of Plato himself. I show that, excepting minor points of similarity, Schopenhauer’s account is quite inauthentic to that of Plato. Still more, drawing upon his distinction between abstract and intuitive knowledge, I offer an interpretation of the relationship between Genius and contemplation employing the concept of a “circle of signification”. Finally, I identify some difficulties in relation to Schopenhauer’s views.
(2016). Comprehending the Whole: Methodological Principles Governing Aristotelian Metaphysics and Ethics. Dodoni: The Annuaire Scientifique of the Department of Philosophy of the University of Ioannina, 37, 29-39.
Abstract: Within this essay, I consider the nature of philosophical inquiry by way of examination and identification of three methodological principles governing the unity of Aristotelian metaphysics and ethics.1 By “methodological principles” is here meant general principles governing (1) the aims of inquiry, (2) comprehension of common features of experience and (3) the hierarchical organization of the sciences with respect to one another. So by “methodology” I neither mean nor restrict the use of this term to something along the lines of a fixed set of unchanging rules or norms of inquiry, as is commonly understood. Although philosophers have and continue to make use of a diverse set of methods throughout history (from deduction and induction to analysis and interpretation), such methods hardly distinguish philosophy methodologically from the several other sciences that make use of similar methods. From this perspective, it is necessary to identify the fundamental “forms” of inquiry, as it were, those principles governing philosophical inquiry itself.
(2015). Shadows of Consciousness: The Problem of Phenomenal Properties. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 14(4), 851-865.
Abstract: The aim of this essay is to show that phenomenal properties are contentless modes of appearances of representational properties. The essay initiates with examination of the first-person perspective of the conscious observer according to which a “reference to I” with respect to the observation of experience is determined. A distinction is then drawn between the conscious observer and experience as observed, according to which, three distinct modifications of experience are delineated. These modifications are then analyzed with respect to the content of experience and from this the ground of the distinction between phenomenal and representational properties is determined.
(2015). Subjectivity and the Encounter with Being. The Review of Metaphysics, 68(3), 593-614.
Abstract: Following Kant, subjectivity is seen as an obstacle to any access into things themselves. For this reason, Kant concludes that metaphysics as the science of being as being is necessarily impossible. In this essay, the possibilities of metaphysics in light of the problem of subjectivity are reexamined. The nature of subjectivity and the subject’s encounter with being are analyzed yielding two fundamental relational structures that hold with respect to being and the subject. Further examination of the act of reflection coupled with judgment reveals that these structures may in fact be transcended, from which an encounter with being as such follows. On the basis of reflection and judgment, metaphysics is in consequence determined to be possible.
(2008). The Euclidean Mousetrap: Schopenhauer’s Criticism of the Synthetic Method in Geometry.” Journal of Idealistic Studies, 38(3), 209-220.
Abstract: In his doctoral dissertation On the Principle of Sufficient Reason, Arthur Schopenhauer there outlines a critique of Euclidean geometry on the basis of the changing nature of mathematics, and hence of demonstration, as a result of Kantian idealism. According to Schopenhauer, Euclid treats geometry synthetically, proceeding from the simple to the complex, from the known to the unknown, “synthesizing” later proofs on the basis of earlier ones. Such a method, although proving the case logically, nevertheless fails to attain the raison d’être of the entity. In order to obtain this, a separate method is required, which Schopenhauer refers to as “analysis”, thus echoing a method already in practice among the early Greek geometers, with however some significant differences. In this essay, I here discuss Schopenhauer’s criticism of synthesis in Euclid’s Elements, and the nature and relevance of his own method of analysis.
Conference Proceedings
(2025). Is Being a Primitive Term: Questions About the Meaning of Being in Heidegger. Proceedings of the 49th Annual European Studies Conference, May 2025.
Abstract: A primitive term is an undefinable concept intuitively understood by those familiar with the language in which it is used. Examples include such geometrical concepts as point and line. This essay explores whether the concept of ‘being’ qualifies as a primitive term. Martin Heidegger famously argued that the Western metaphysical tradition has overlooked—indeed, forgotten—the question of the meaning of being, claiming it requires recovery and reformulation. However, if being is a primitive term, Heidegger’s quest for its meaning may well amount to a pseudo-problem—one that misinterprets the nature of being as a foundational concept of metaphysics. This paper seeks to examine these issues, exploring the validity of Heidegger’s critique and its relationship to the classical metaphysical tradition, with the aim of gaining a deeper understanding of the question and its broader implications for metaphysical inquiry.
(2022). Camus, Sisyphus, and the Logic of Despair. Proceedings of the 46th Annual European Studies Conference, May 2022.
Abstract: In his 1942 book The Myth of Sisyphus, Albert Camus offers a memorable interpretation of the ancient Greek account of Sisyphus who is damned to forever push a boulder up a mountain. Camus likens this myth metaphorically to the absurdity of human existence. He offers three responses to this in the form of suicide, the leap of faith, and rebellion. Whereas he rejects the first two as pseudo-responses, he embraces the third as authentic. The rebel is one who embraces meaninglessness (in Sisyphean fashion), and in doing so, ‘rebels’ against absurdity creating meaning for him or herself. Within this paper, I reexamine Camus’s interpretation and conclusions. I show that his account follows from a logic of despair in which meaninglessness is assumed to be the case. When once the assumptions of this logic are exposed, however, it can be shown that both the leap of faith as well as rebellion stand on opposing sides, the former involving trust and the latter distrust in the possibility of meaningfulness.
(2019). Aristotle and Collingwood on Class Overlap. The Philosophy of Aristotle, Proceedings of the World Congress of Philosophy, 4, 331-343.
Abstract: This paper examines R. G. Collingwood’s account of class overlap in An Essay on Philosophical Method (1933) and argues that its ultimate foundation can be explained in relation to Aristotle’s account of the analogy of being. Collingwood distinguishes philosophy from the special sciences by claiming that philosophical concepts exhibit overlapping rather than mutually exclusive classes. While he offers examples of this phenomenon, he does not explain why philosophical concepts possess this distinctive structure. I argue that the answer lies in philosophy’s primary subject matter: being. Drawing on Aristotle and the medieval ontological tradition, I show that being is the most universal concept, cannot be a genus, and therefore cannot be defined in the ordinary classificatory sense. Because philosophical inquiry culminates in being, it necessarily transcends standard genus-species classification. The categories are consequently understood not as species of being but as overlapping divisions or modes of being. This metaphysical structure, I contend, provides the basis for Collingwood’s account of philosophical methodology.
(2012). Cartesian Doubt and Metaphysics. Proceedings of the 5th World Conference in Metaphysics, Fondazione Idente di Studi e di Ricerca, 991-1000.
Abstract: Since Descartes, the nature of doubt has played a central role in the development of metaphysics both positively and negatively. Despite this fact, there has been very little discussion centering round the specific nature of doubt which led, for example, to the Cartesian discovery of the cogito. Certainly, the role of doubt has been well recognized: through doubt Descartes arrives at his indubitable first principle. But what can it mean to doubt the existence of the sensible world? This would seem to rest upon the assumption that we have clear and distinct knowledge of the precise nature of what it means to exist and indeed of what it means to be. As it stands, Descartes’ initiates his Meditations upon certain definite assumptions that demand more thorough interrogation. In this paper and presentation, I examine the possible assumptions inherent in the Cartesian method of doubt within the first and second meditation and the manner in which this leads to the discovery of the cogito. I consider a number of essential questions in light of this: What presuppositions lie at bottom to Cartesian doubt? What is the precise nature of metaphysical doubt? What can it mean to doubt the existence of the sensible world?
Encyclopedia Entries
(2021). Raum / Zeit. (Encyclopedia entry) in Schopenhauer Lexikon, D. Schubbe & J. Lemanski (eds.), UTB Verlag, 214-215.
Book Reviews
(2019). Review of “Philosophers in the Classroom”, ed., Cahn et. Al, in Philosophy in Review 39:3 (August 2019): 113-115.
(2018). Review of “Metaphor and Philosophy: Philosophy as Combat, Play and Aesthetic Experience”, by Sarah A. Mattice, in Philosophy in Review 38:4 (November 2018): 142-144.
(2017). Review of “The Oxford Handbook of Philosophical Methodology”, by Cappelen et al., in Philosophy in Review 37:3 (June 2017): 97-99.
(2015). Review of “The Mirror of the World: Subjects, Consciousness and Self-Consciousness”, by Christopher Peacocke, in Philosophy in Review 36:1 (February 2016): 20-22
(2015). Review of “Humanism and Religion: A Call for the Renewal of Western Culture,” by Hans Zimmerman, in Philosophy in Review 35:1 (2015): 53-55.
(2014). Review of “Categories of Being: Essays on Metaphysics and Logic,” by Haaparanta & Koskinen (eds.), in Philosophy in Review 34:1-2 (2014): 52-55.
(2013). Review of “Philosophical Devices: Proofs, Probabilities, Possibilities, and Sets,” by David Papineau, in Metapsychology Online Reviews 17:30 (July 2013).
(2013). Review of “Schopenhauer’s World as Will and Representation,” by Robert Wicks, in Philosophy in Review 33:3 (July 2013): 243–245.
(2006). Review of “Heidegger’s Philosophy of Being: A Critical Interpretation,” by Herman Philipse, Theoria: A Journal of Social and Political Theory 110 (August 2006).
(2006). Review of “Introduction to German Philosophy: From Kant to Habermas,” by Andrew Bowie, Theoria: A Journal of Social and Political Theory 111 (December 2006).
